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The Patent Litigation Explosion
James Bessen and Michael J. Meurer*
This Article provides the first look at patent litigation hazards for
public firms during the 1980s and 1990s. Litigation is more likely when
prospective plaintiffs acquire more patents, when firms are larger and
technologically close and when prospective defendants spend more on
research and development (“R&D”). The latter suggests inadvertent
infringement may be more important than piracy. Public firms face
dramatically increased hazards of litigation as plaintiffs and even more
rapidly increasing hazards as defendants, especially for small public
firms. The increase cannot be explained by patenting rates, R&D, firm
value or industry composition. Legal changes are the most likely
explanation.
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INTRODUCTION
The annual number of patent lawsuits filed in the United States more
than tripled since 1990.1 Is this cause for concern?
Other research suggests that patent litigation can affect innovation
incentives. Economic historian Zorina Khan argues that the introduction
of the patent examination system during the nineteenth century reduced
the relative number of patent lawsuits and that this substantially spurred
inventive activity.2 Josh Lerner finds that the threat of litigation deters
biotech firms from innovating in some technology fields.3 Lanjouw and
Lerner find that the use of preliminary injunctions by large firms
discourages research and development (“R&D”) by small firms.4 Does
the recent jump in patent litigation reduce the incentives firms have to
innovate?
The answer depends on what is driving the increase. To understand
this, we take a comprehensive look at the factors that cause the disputes
that result in litigation. Our analysis is based on a formal theoretical
model presented in a companion paper.5
1. See PRICE WATERHOUSE COOPERS, 2012 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY 6 (2012), available at
http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/forensic-services/publications/assets/2012-patent-litigationstudy.pdf (reporting an annual 6.4% growth in patent actions filed from 1991 through 2011); see
also id. at 6 fig.1 (documenting the number of patent case filings made and patents granted from
1991 to 2011). As discussed below, this figure represents case filings reported by the United States
Patent and Trademark Office and this series only captures about two-thirds of all filings. However,
the degree of under-reporting is stable over time, so the nature of the trend in total filings is the
same.
2. See B. ZORINA KHAN, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF INVENTION: PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS
IN AMERICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 1790–1920, at 60 (2004) (explaining that the patent
examination system “reduced uncertainty about the validity of patents” and “enabled financially
disadvantaged inventors to appropriate returns through the market for invention”).
3. Josh Lerner, Patenting in the Shadow of Competitors, 38 J.L. & ECON. 463, 463 (1995).
4. Jean O. Lanjouw & Josh Lerner, Tilting the Table? The Use of Preliminary Injunctions, 44
J.L. & ECON. 573, 573 (2001).
5. See James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Patent Litigation with Endogenous Disputes, 96 AM.
ECON. REV. 77, 77 (2006) (presenting a model of patent disputes that considers behavior by
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In an ideal world, patents would work like real property and be largely
self-policing: technology adopters would either completely avoid
patented technologies or they would obtain ex ante licenses before
sinking funds into development and commercialization. But unlike real
property, where, say, few disputes arise over land boundaries after
buildings have been erected, technology adopters do end up in court for
investments they have made in allegedly infringing technologies.
Two different stories might explain the origin of these disputes. In
one, the patent holder may not know about the infringer. In this
“cheating” story, the technology adopter observes and imitates a patented
technology, and may take steps to avoid detection. This behavior induces
the patent holder to expend resources monitoring for infringement and,
on the occasion that infringement is discovered, to expend additional
resources on negotiating a license and/or on litigation. These costs
effectively increase the cost of patenting, making patents less attractive,
and thus ultimately reducing R&D incentives.
In the other story, the adopter develops its own technology and is
unaware of another firm’s putative patent rights. This kind of innocent
infringement occurs because patent rights often have uncertain
boundaries or questionable validity. Patents differ from real property
where the boundaries of a plot of land and the validity of a title usually
can be verified at little cost and with little uncertainty. In contrast, the
validity of a patent may be challenged and firms often have difficulty
determining whether a technology infringes the boundaries of a patent’s
claims. Indeed, even district court judges have difficulty determining the
boundaries of patent claims—30–40% of their claim interpretation
decisions are reversed on appeal.6 In addition, the sheer number of
patents facing a typical innovator makes careful assessment quite
burdensome. Furthermore, patent claims are often hidden (sometimes
strategically) until after firms have sunk technology investments.
We call this the “exposure” story, because the more that firms invest
in technology, the more they are exposed to the risk of a patent dispute.
These disputes yield litigation or licensing under the threat of litigation,
and sap rents from innovative firms. The reduction in rents relative to a
situation with clearly defined and certain property rights can be viewed
as the cost of patent disputes. This cost reduces innovators’ incentives to
invest in R&D.

potential infringers and patent infringement “defendants who ‘invent around’ a patent, and
defendants who are unaware of the patented technology”).
6. Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More Predictable?,
9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231, 246 (2005).
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These two stories affect the significance of the increase in patent
litigation. If the “exposure” story is correct, then there is reason for
concern. We find that the risk of being sued for infringement has
increased by about 70% per R&D dollar. In this case, then, the increased
rate of litigation means that innovative firms have lower incentives to
invest in R&D.
If, on the other hand, the “cheating” story is correct, then the impact of
the patent litigation explosion is less troubling. This is because the
expected number of suits per patent has not risen much, so patent holders
may not face markedly higher costs of enforcement per patent. Of course,
there still may be a negative effect on alleged infringers’ R&D (which
may be socially beneficial) and litigation may waste resources, but the
“cheating” story does not generate such a clear concern about litigation.
Our empirical analysis aims to nest both stories, to distinguish between
them and to evaluate which factors are driving the increase in litigation.
We conduct this analysis at two levels. First, we study the probability
that one randomly selected firm files suit against another randomly
selected firm in the same industry in a given year. Among the right hand
side variables we include the size of each firm’s patent portfolio,
employment, R&D spending and market value and the technological
proximity of the two firms. This allows us to test various theoretical
explanations of firm litigation. Second, we perform an aggregate
analysis, studying the hazards that a firm will engage in patent litigation
as a plaintiff and, separately, as a defendant against all possible other
parties. This gives us a more comprehensive estimate of the contribution
of different factors to the increase in aggregate litigation.
Our Article differs from previous research in two principal ways. First,
our model of litigation addresses the origin of patent disputes, not just
dispute settlement. With the important exception of Crampes and
Langinier,7 most of the theoretical literature on litigation takes the
existence of a dispute as a given and then asks what factors determine
whether the disputants will settle or proceed to trial.8 Much of the
7. Claude Crampes & Corinne Langinier, Litigation and Settlement in Patent Infringement
Cases, 33 RAND J. ECON. 258, 258–74 (2002) (studying decisions faced by a firm that is already
a patent owner, such as how to monitor patents and react to infringement).
8. For recent surveys, see Bruce Hay & Kathy Spier, Settlement of Litigation, in THE NEW
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 442, 442–51 (1998); Jean O. Lanjouw &
Josh Lerner, The Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights: A Survey of the Empirical Literature
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6296, 1997). Models of patent settlement
used in empirical research are found in Dietmar Harhoff & Markus Reitzig, Determinants of
Opposition Against EPO Patent Grants—The Case of Biotechnology and Pharmaceuticals, 22/4
INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 443, 443–80 (2004), and Deepak Somaya, Strategic Determinants of
Decisions Not to Settle Patent Litigation, 24 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 17, 17–38 (2003), available at
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empirical literature follows suit.9 But the rate of lawsuit filing depends
as much on the frequency of disputes as the frequency of bargaining
breakdown. Our model incorporates both. We assume patent-related
investments by one firm and investments related to the development and
adoption of technology by another firm interact to create patent disputes.
Attention to the origins of disputes is important because our data suggest
that (after controlling for the number of inventions) more frequent
disputes, not more frequent bargaining failures, are driving the increase
in patent lawsuit filing.
Second, our analysis differs from most previous research in that we use
the firm as the unit of analysis as well as randomly selected pairs of firms.
Our aim is to understand how firm choices affect litigation rates and how
firms are affected by litigation hazards, so this is a natural modeling
choice. With the important exception of Rosemarie Ziedonis’s study of
semiconductor industry patent litigation,10 most studies have either
looked at the rate of litigation per patent11 or have looked at aggregate
litigation rates.12 Although these statistics are informative, our model
provides a richer, multi-factor picture of firm litigation behavior that can
distinguish between a variety of possible explanations for the increase in
litigation rates.
The rest of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes our model
of patent disputes, some hypotheses from this model and the specification
of equations we estimate. Part II describes our data and Part III reports
our empirical results. Part IV discusses the interpretation of these results
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/smj.281/pdf.
9. See e.g., Michael J. Meurer, The Settlement of Patent Litigation, 20 RAND J. ECON. 77, 77–
91 (1989) (discussing a “settlement bargain between a patentee and a potential patent challenger”);
Somaya, supra note 8, at 17–18 (documenting empirical studies to better understand the role of
patent litigation in technology firm strategy).
10. Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, Patent Litigation in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, in PATENTS
IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 180, 182 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds.,
2003) (examining the characteristics of patent-related lawsuits in the semiconductor industry from
1973 to 2001).
11. See, e.g., John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley, Kimberly A. Moore & R. Derek Trunkey,
Valuable Patents, 92 GEO L.J. 435, 435–79 (2004) [hereinafter Allison et al., Valuable Patents]
(studying litigated patents in an effort to identify characteristics of the most valuable patents); Jean
O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Protecting Intellectual Property Rights: Are Small Firms
Handicapped?, 47 J.L. & ECON. 45, 45–74 (2004) [hereinafter Lanjouw & Schankerman, Small
Firms] (analyzing the rate of litigation per patent to show that individuals or small firms owning
few patents face greater litigation risk than firms with larger patent portfolios).
12. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (2003); Jon F. Merz & Nicholas M. Pace, Trends in Patent
Litigation: The Apparent Influence of Strengthened Patents Attributable to the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 579, 579–80 (1994) (analyzing
aggregate litigation rates to show how the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit contributed to
increased predictability and enforceability of patents).
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and a conclusion follows.
I. MODEL AND SPECIFICATION
A. Dispute, Filing and Settlement
Our model concerns the probability that firm 1 will file a lawsuit
against firm 2. We present just a brief overview of the model and the
intuitions that lead to testable hypotheses. The details of the model are
available in a companion paper.13 Initially, the firms simultaneously
choose their levels of R&D spending. Firm 1 also chooses the quantity
and quality of patents it obtains. In addition to choosing to obtain more
patents, firm 1 can “refine” the (private) quality of its patents by delaying
the issuance of some of its patents through continuation practice, crafting
multiple claims, investing in high quality claims and disclosures and
conducting a careful prior art search.
At this stage, the firms do not know the probability that firm 1 will win
a lawsuit if it files one. They do, however, know the distribution of these
probabilities. In addition, each firm’s investments may alter this
distribution. If firm 1 gets more patents or better quality patents, then it
will be more likely to win. Firm 2’s R&D investment may also alter the
probability of a win. If firm 2 invests R&D in “inventing around,” then
firm 1 will be less likely to win. Alternatively, firm 2’s investment in
new technology may expose it to greater risk of infringement, increasing
the probability that firm 1 will win a suit.
After the investments are made, the actual probability is revealed and
the firms choose actions with four possible outcomes: firm 2 may decide
to abandon its investment (or seek an ex post license); firm 1 may ignore
firm 2; or they may enter a dispute. In this last case, they either negotiate
a settlement without filing a lawsuit, or firm 1 files a lawsuit (subsequent
settlement may still occur).
We make a simple assumption to analyze the factors that will affect
the probability of litigation: we assume that the distribution of win
probabilities is skewed to the left, meaning that most randomly selected
pairs of firms have a low probability of suing each other and winning. 14
This means that factors that shift the probability distribution to the right
(left) will increase (decrease) the probability of litigation.
Given this set up, the following intuitions can be formally
13. Bessen & Meurer, supra note 5, at 77–79.
14. More precisely, we assume that the probability density decreases monotonically. We also
assume that firm variables are correlated with business unit variables, for example, larger firms
have larger product markets. This is important because the model really concerns the interaction
between business units of the two firms, but our observed variables are at the firm level.
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demonstrated:
H1: Technological Distance. The probability of litigation between
two firms increases with their proximity in technological space, all
else equal.
The intuition here is simply that a firm pursuing technology “near”
another firm’s patent portfolio exposes itself to greater risk of
infringement.
H2: Stakes. The probability of litigation between two firms increases
with the size of the stakes, all else equal.
Greater stakes mean that firm 1 will prefer to sue rather than settle for
a greater range of situations. Greater stakes also mean that firm 2 will
rather litigate than abandon development for a greater range of situations.
H3: Patent Portfolio. The probability that firm 1 sues firm 2 increases
with the patent portfolio size of firm 1, all else equal.
This hypothesis captures the notion that firm 1 increases its probability
of winning with a greater number of patents, all else equal. A larger
number of patents means that a rival may be more likely to trip over one
(exposure). Also, a patent “fence” may limit the opportunities for rivals
to invent around.15 If the probability distribution is shifted to the right,
this means a greater probability of litigation. Note that in general this
increase need not be proportional, that is, the elasticity of the probability
of filing with respect to firm 1’s patent portfolio size may be less than
one.
H4: Defensive Patenting. If firms use patent portfolio trading to avoid
litigation, then the probability that firm 1 sues firm 2 will decrease
with firm 2’s patent portfolio size, all else equal.
That is, firm 2’s “defensive” portfolio will increase the probability of
settlement and reduce the probability of filing.
The next two hypotheses concern the relationship between firm 2’s
development investment and the probability of filing.
H5: Inventing Around. Controlling for the stakes of each firm, if firm
2 uses development investment to “invent around” patents, then the
probability of litigation should decrease with firm 2’s R&D, all else
equal.
The intuition here is that those prospective defendants who invest more

15. Patent fencing is “a specific [patent] filing strategy to use multiple related patents to further
enhance value appropriation.” Christian Sternitzke, An Exploratory Analysis of Patent Fencing in
Pharmaceuticals: The Case of PDE5 Inhibitors, 42 RES. POL’Y 542, 542 (2013). For a discussion
of patent fencing, see Wesley M. Cohen, Richard R. Nelson & John P. Walsh, Protecting Their
Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not)
1–5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7552, 2000).
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in inventing around will be less likely to be found to infringe firm 1’s
patents, so firm 1 will be less likely to sue them. Those firms that simply
imitate without expending resources to invent around will be more likely
to be sued.
On the other hand,
H6: Exposure Effect. Controlling for the stakes of each firm, if firm 2
increases its exposure to infringement by investing in technology, then
the probability of litigation should increase with firm 2’s R&D, all else
equal.
This hypothesis captures the notion that prospective defendants who
invest more in development (deliberately or inadvertently) expose
themselves to greater risk of infringement. Inadvertent infringement may
be common because of the difficulty determining whether a technology
is likely to infringe a patent, and because relevant patents may issue after
development and even adoption is completed.
These hypotheses encompass several variations of the model that may
be helpful to understand what drives patent litigation and what may
explain the trends in litigation.
B. Specification
These hypotheses can be nested in a simple regression. We define a
general logit regression equation:

(1)

y ABt  Pfirm A sues firm B in year t  

e z  t
1  e z  t

z  X At   X Bt   X At X Bt  

where X it is a vector of firm characteristics for firm i at time t and  t is
a time dummy. Following the above discussion, this vector might include
the R&D spending, scale (employment), patent portfolio sizes of both
firms and the technological distance between them. This equation is
estimated over pairs of firms who are potential litigants.
Because the potential number of pairs of firms is very large and
because we want to understand the aggregate effect of litigation on firms,
it is also helpful to calculate firm hazards. As long as the probability that
firm A sues firm B is independent of the probability that firm A sues firm
C, etc., the expected number of suits can be calculated as sums of these

hAtp  Enumber of suits filed by A in year t 

y
j A

hBtd  Enumber of suits filed against B in year t 

Ajt

y
jB

jBt
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probabilities:
Note further that if z and y are sufficiently small, y ABt  e t 1  z  .
Using this approximation,

ln hAtp   X At  t  
(2)

   X

t   t  ln N  1   X t   X t  X 

where X t is the mean over firms and X is the mean over firms and years.
Note that this form is the familiar log linear Poisson regression. A similar
expression can be derived for the defendant’s hazard,
(3)

ln hBtd   X Bt  t  

Finally, note that if there are no interaction terms in (1), that is, if
  0 , then    and    . In words, the coefficients of the Poisson
regressions, (2) and (3), should match those of the corresponding
variables in the logit pairs regression, (1).
II. DATA DESCRIPTION
A. Data Sources
Our research matches records from three data sources: lawsuit filings
from Derwent’s Litalert database, firm financial data from Compustat and
patent data from the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(“USPTO”) made available by The National Bureau of Economic
Research (“NBER”).
As in most of the prior research, we use lawsuit filings as our measure
of litigation. Patent disputes are properly viewed as a process consisting
of many stages where settlement is possible at each stage and costs are
incurred during each stage. Although a trial is the costliest stage, the
majority of legal costs occur prior to trial16 and opportunity costs
experienced by the firm (e.g., postponed business) may also be quite
large.17 Furthermore, significant costs may be incurred even when patent
16. AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 16 (2003).
17. See Catherine Tucker, Patent Trolls and Technology Diffusion 1–28 (Tilberg Law and Econ.
Ctr., Discussion Paper No. 2012–030, 2013) (documenting how a patent troll’s lawsuit against an
imaging software sales company caused sales to decline by one-third due to a “lack of incremental
product innovation” throughout litigation).
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disputes are resolved prior to filing a lawsuit.18 Thus the event of a filing
represents a foregone opportunity to settle and a credible commitment to
incur some level of litigation cost that could have been avoided.
Our primary source of information on lawsuit filings is Derwent’s
Litalert database, a database that has been used by several previous
researchers.19 Federal courts are required to report all lawsuits filed that
involve patents to the USPTO and Derwent’s data is based on these
filings. Beginning with the Derwent data from 1984 through 2000, we
removed duplicate records involving the same lawsuit as identified by
Derwent’s cross-reference fields. We also removed lawsuits filed on the
same day, with the same docket number and involving the same primary
patent. Sometimes firms respond to lawsuits by filing counter-suits of
their own, perhaps involving other patents. Since our main focus is on
disputes rather than on lawsuit filings per se, we also removed filings
made within ninety days of a given suit that involved the same parties.
Finally, we removed filings where the current USPTO Commissioner was
a party. This left us with 16,534 lawsuits filed from 1984 through 2000
(see Figure 1). Almost all of these lawsuits involved utility patents,
including re-issued patents.20
Previous researchers have found that apparently not all lawsuits
involving patents do, in fact, get reported to the USPTO. The Federal
Judicial Center (“FJC”) collects data directly from the administrative
office of the courts and the FJC consistently reports a larger number of
filings. Two potential problems arise from under-reporting: (1) a possible
change in the reporting ratio over time, leading to spurious trends in the
Derwent data; and (2) possible selection bias. After de-duplicating FJC
data, we found that our database had only 64% of the number of lawsuits
contained in the FJC data. However, although there was some year-toyear variation in this ratio, it appeared to be stable over time: the ratio
averaged 63.9% from 1984–90 and 64.1% from 1991–99. There thus
appears to be no significant trend in this reporting ratio.21 Also, using an
18. See James E. Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99
CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 16–17, 30 tbl.3) (on file with author) (finding
that “non-litigated patent assertions are responsible for much of the direct costs imposed by [nonpracticing entities] on operating companies”).
19. See, e.g., Lanjouw & Schankerman, Small Firms, supra note 11, at 45; Ziedonis, supra note
10, at 196–98.
20. In a small percentage of cases Derwent did not report a patent or listed a design patent.
21. Lanjouw and Schankerman report that their comparable ratio was stable during the 1990s.
Lanjouw & Schankerman, Small Firms, supra note 11, at 50. At the suggestion of Zorina Khan,
we also compared our data to counts of lawsuit activity from LexisNexis, even though these data
are not directly comparable. The ratio of LexisNexis counts to FJC data, however, did exhibit
marked variation over time.
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extensive match between the two files, Lanjouw and Schankerman find
no difference between reported and unreported cases over a range of
variables, providing no suggestion of selection bias.22 Since the FJC data
do not report all parties to a lawsuit, we chose to use the Derwent data
despite this under-reporting. In the tables below, when we report firm
litigation hazards, these estimates have been corrected for underreporting (they have been divided by .64).
To explore characteristics of firms involved in these lawsuits, we
matched the listed plaintiffs and defendants to the Compustat database of
U.S. firms from 1984–99 that report financials (excluding American
Depository Receipts of foreign firms traded on U.S. exchanges). These
data were based on merged historical data tapes from Compustat and
involved an extensive process of tracking firms through various types of
re-organization and eliminating duplicate records for firms (e.g.,
consolidated subsidiaries listed separately from their parent
companies).23
The lawsuit data were matched to the Compustat data by comparing
the litigant name with all domestic firm names in Compustat and also a
list of subsidiary names used in Bessen and Hunt.24 At least one party
was identified as a publicly traded U.S. firm in 42% of the 16,534 cases.
To check the validity and coverage of this match, we randomly
selected a number of parties to suits and then checked them manually
using various databases including PACER, LexisNexis, the Directory of
Corporate Affiliations and the LexisNexis M&A databases. Although we
were not able to definitively identify all parties, the rate of false positives
was not more than 3% (no more than 5 of 165 parties were found to have
been falsely matched) and the rate of false negatives was no more than
7% (no more than 34 of 502 public companies were not matched).
To obtain information about each firm’s non-litigated patents, we also
matched Compustat firms to the NBER patent database.25 To match the
USPTO assignee name to the Compustat firm name, we began with the
22. Id.
23. This work was conducted by Bob Hunt and Annette Fratantaro at the Federal Reserve Bank
of Philadelphia for an earlier project and we thank them for graciously sharing it with us.
24. James Bessen & Robert M. Hunt, An Empirical Look at Software Patents 12–13, 42 (Bos.
Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 03–17/R, 2004). A software program identified and scored
likely name matches, taking into account spelling errors, abbreviations and common alternatives
for legal forms of organization. These were then manually reviewed and accepted or rejected. Note
that this match is based on the actual parties to litigation, not the original assignee of the patent at
issue.
25. See Bronwyn H. Hall, Adam B. Jaffe & Manuel Trajtenberg, The NBER Patent Citations
Data File: Lessons, Insights and Methodological Tools 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 8498, 2001) (describing the NBER database on U.S. patents).
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match file provided by the NBER. To this we added matches on
subsidiaries developed by Bessen and Hunt,26 manually matched names
for large patenters and R&D-performers and matched a large number of
additional firms using a name-matching program.27 In addition, using
data on mergers and acquisitions from the Thomson Reuters Securities
Data Company Platinum (“SDC”) database,28 we tracked patent
assignees to their acquiring firms. Since a public firm may be acquired,
yet still receive patents as a subsidiary of its acquirer, we matched patents
assigned to an acquired entity in a given year to the firm that owned that
entity in that year.29 This matched group of firms includes 10,736 patent
assignees matched to one of 8444 owning firms in Compustat, with as
many as five different owners matched to each assignee. This matched
group accounts for 96% of the R&D performed by all U.S. Compustat
firms, 77% of all R&D-reporting firms listed in Compustat and 62% of
all patents issued to domestic non-governmental organizations during the
sample period. Sample statistics show that this matched sample is
broadly representative of the entire Compustat sample, although it is
slightly weighted toward larger and incumbent firms. Testing our match
against a sample of 131 semiconductor industry firms that had been
manually matched, we correctly matched 90% of the firms that accounted
for 99.5% of the patents acquired by this group.30
B. Variables
The main variables of interest are as follows:
The number of suits per firm per year. This is the number of suits to
which the firm is a party. We also sought to determine whether the firm
was attempting to enforce a patent or whether the firm was seeking to
defend against a patent. The Derwent data do not distinguish whether the
suit filed is an infringement suit or a declaratory judgment suit. As a
prerequisite to filing a declaratory action, a firm must show it has been
threatened with an infringement suit; the declaratory action aims for a
judgment that the patent is uninfringed or invalid. To classify each suit,
26. Bessen & Hunt, supra note 24; see also supra text accompanying note 24.
27. A similar software program determined matches between the two files by identifying firm
names that matched after taking into account spelling errors, abbreviations and common
alternatives for legal forms of organization. In addition, a separate program identified Compustat
firms with unique names that were not found in the USPTO assignee file. These were classified as
firms that did not obtain patents through 1999.
28. SDC PLATINUM, http://thomsonreuters.com/sdc-platinum/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2013).
29. This dynamic matching process is different from that used in the original NBER data set,
which statically matched a patent assignee to a Compustat firm. These data were developed with
the help of Megan MacGarvie, to whom we are indebted.
30. Thanks to Rosemarie Ziedonis, who originally compiled this data, for sharing it with us.
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we first identified whether the patent assignee at issue matched one of the
parties to the suit. If the assignee matched a plaintiff, the suit was
classified as an infringement suit; if the assignee matched a defendant,
the suit was classified as a declaratory action. We were able to match the
assignee for 83% of the suits, and of these, only 17% were declaratory
actions.31 If the assignee did not match a party to the suit, then it was
classified as an infringement suit because there are relatively few
declaratory actions.32 This classification then allowed us to create two
new variables: (1) the number of suits per year for which the firm was a
“patentee litigant” (that is, plaintiff in an infringement suit or defendant
in a declaratory action); and (2) the number of suits per year for which
the firm was an “alleged infringer” (the reverse).33 Below, when we
speak of one firm “suing” another, we mean the suing firm is a patentee
litigant and the other is an alleged infringer, even though the suing firm
may not actually be the plaintiff.
Portfolio size. To obtain a measure of firm patent portfolio size, we
used the number of patents assigned to the firm over the previous eight
years. We chose eight years because this number allowed us to capture a
reasonable measure of the patents effectively in force without consuming
too much of our sample. This is our main proxy for patent refinement
effort.
Patent characteristics. We also estimated the “adjusted” number of
claims per patent, citations made per patent (backward citations) and
citations received per patent (forward citations) for the litigated patents
and also for the firm’s entire patent portfolio. Since these characteristics
tend to change across patent classes, the “adjusted” characteristics are
estimated as deviations from the mean of the patent’s class.
Newly public firm. This dummy variable is set to one only during the
first five years in which the firm appears in Compustat. This group
largely consists of firms that have recently gone public, and these are
largely young firms.
31. These numbers are quite similar to findings by Moore, Lanjouw and Schankerman. See
Lanjouw & Schankerman, Small Firms, supra note 11, at 50 (reporting that 85% of patent suits
were infringement suits, as opposed to declaratory judgments); Kimberly A. Moore, Jury Demands:
Who’s Asking?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 847, 853 n.19 (2002) (finding that the “accused infringer,
rather than the patent holder, filed suit in the form of a declaratory judgment action” in 15% of
cases).
32. We ran our analysis after excluding cases without a matched assignee and the results were
broadly similar.
33. There are some observable differences between, say, plaintiffs in infringement cases and
defendants in declaratory actions (the latter tend to be somewhat larger firms). However, we ran
our analysis separately for these different groups and the results were broadly similar. For this
reason, we only report the combined results here.
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Industry groups. We divide firms into eight industry groups according
to their primary product category as identified by Compustat: SIC 28
(chemicals, including pharmaceuticals), SIC 35 (machinery, including
computers), SIC 36 (electronics), SIC 38 (instruments), other
manufacturing (SIC 20–39, excluding the above), SIC 73 (business
services including software), SIC 50–59 (retail and wholesale) and other
non-manufacturing. These classifications use the SIC code assigned by
Compustat for the primary line of business of the firm for the given year.
Technological closeness. Two firms may use similar technologies or
very different technologies. To measure their technological “closeness,”
we calculate a measure developed by Jaffe. 34 This measure is computed
by first calculating the share of each firm’s patents the USPTO assigns to
each technology class as the patent’s primary classification. For each
firm we get a vector of 426 class shares. The technological closeness of
two firms is calculated as the uncentered correlation of the two
corresponding vectors. We do this calculation for all public firms with
patents over two time periods: 1984–91 and 1992–99. Also, for each
firm, we compute weighted sums of other firms’ patent portfolio sizes
and other firms’ R&D expenditures using the closeness measure as a
weight. These measures represent the number of patents and R&D
spending in the firm’s “neighborhood.”
Firm financial and other data. These include: employees in
thousands; R&D, cashflow and sales all deflated by the GDP deflator;
capital defined as property, plant and equipment deflated by the NIPA
capital goods deflator; and firm market value (long term debt plus the
market value of common and preferred stock).
C. Characteristics of the Samples
We use two main samples in our analysis. The first is the matched
sample described above with 118,495 firm-year observations from 1984–
99. The second sample is generated from the first. It consists of
observations of pairs of firms for each year and we use this to explore the
probability that one firm will sue another. All pairs of firms that share
the same primary line of business (at the four-digit SIC level) are included
twice (firm 1 sues firm 2 and firm 2 sues firm 1), comprising 1,240,580
observations from 1984–99 after excluding cases with missing variables
and firms in retail and wholesale industries.
Table 1 shows means and medians of several variables estimated for
firm-years from the basic Compustat sample. The first column shows all
34. Adam B. Jaffe, Technological Opportunity and Spillovers of R&D: Evidence from Firms’
Patents, Profits, and Market Value, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 984 (1986).
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firm-years and the second shows just those observations with positive
patent portfolio size. The third column then shows observations where
the firm was involved in one or more patent suits.
Firms who patent tend to be larger and less likely to be newly public
than all firms. Firms involved in litigation tend to be much larger than
these, although they are no less likely to be new firms. Patent litigation
is very much dominated by large, R&D-intensive firms in absolute terms.
Below we look at relative hazards by size.
The last two columns compare patentee litigants with alleged
infringers.35 If patent infringement were largely a matter of low-tech
copyists imitating patented products or processes, then we should see a
much lower level of R&D spending among alleged infringers and much
higher percentages of firms reporting no R&D and having no patent
portfolios. This is hardly the case. Alleged infringers spend about the
same on R&D as their accusers (more in the mean, slightly less in the
median). Alleged infringers do have a somewhat greater propensity to be
firms who do not report R&D or who do not obtain patents (bear in mind,
some defendants are distributors). It is possible, of course, that relatively
more low-tech copyists are found among unlisted firms.
Patent litigants, both patentees and alleged infringers, tend to have
relatively large patent portfolios on average. We also report mean
“adjusted” characteristics of these portfolios. We adjust for differences
over patent technology classes by reporting the means as deviations from
the mean of the respective patent classes. Thus public firms in general
have more highly refined patents that contain more claims and make more
citations than all patents in matching patent classes, presumably
reflecting greater effort put into patent prosecution. Public firms also
receive more subsequent patent citations.
But note that patentee litigants appear to put greater effort into patent
refinement (they make more citations) than do other public firms.
Alleged infringers obtain patents with fewer claims and backward
citations. This suggests a degree of endogeneity: firms anticipate that
they may assert their patents and so they put extra resources into refining
them so that they will more likely be held valid and infringed.
Finally, note that patentee litigants have patent portfolios that receive
more subsequent citations. Thus, the average patent and not just the
litigated patents owned by patent-asserting firms are cited more often,
35. The last column excludes firms in the retail and wholesale industries. Firms in these
industries are often named in suits because they distribute allegedly infringing goods, but only
rarely for making or using such goods themselves. We exclude them here to provide a clearer
picture of the extent to which alleged infringers are low-tech copyists. Including these firms does
not change the estimates substantially.
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perhaps suggesting that forward patent citations are in part a response to
litigious behavior. This, plus the evidence above, suggests that the
observed correlation other researchers have found between litigation and
patent characteristics36 may involve causality that runs in both directions.
III. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
A. Basic Measures of Litigation Hazard
Table 2 shows mean measures of litigation hazard for public firms with
positive patent portfolios and positive R&D spending. The first two
columns show statistics for the hazard of the firm enforcing its patents as
a patentee litigant and the first three rows show the overall hazards and
the hazards for 1987 and 1999. The first column shows the expected
number of such suits per year. The hazard grew substantially from 1987
to 1999.
The second column imputes a litigation rate per patent. This is
calculated as the mean annual number of suits in which firms are patentee
litigants divided by the mean number of patents granted to firms per year.
This estimate represents the mean number of suits per patent over the
observed time period.37 In contrast to previous research, however, this
estimate reflects the effective patent term.38 We estimate a hazard of
1.18% of lawsuits per patent.
By comparison, Lanjouw and
Schankerman report a rate of 1.04% lawsuits per patent for a sample of
public firms.39 We might expect our figure to be somewhat higher
because our estimate takes into account effective patent term and our
sample of public firms includes many more small firms, who tend to have
higher rates of litigation per patent. Still, the correspondence is close.
As Lanjouw and Schankerman point out, the hazard of litigation per
36. See, e.g., Allison et al., Valuable Patents, supra note 11, at 437–39 (studying characteristics
of litigated patents to determine characteristics of valuable patents); Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark
Schankerman, The Quality of Ideas: Measuring Innovation with Multiple Indicators 2 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7345, 1999) (reporting correlations between
litigation and four indicators: the number of patent claims, forward citations, backward citations
and family size).
37. Suppose the effective patent term is T, the grant rate is n and the litigation rate is l. Then
the firm’s effective patent portfolio at any time is n T, so the annual number of suits per patent is l
/ nT and over the entire effective patent term the expected number of suits per patent is just l / n.
Since the means are estimated over a limited time period, these estimates effectively assume that
the litigation rate per patent is the same before, during and after the sample period. Since the patent
term is factored out, this estimate is robust to variation in T by construction.
38. The effective patent term may be shorter than the statutory term of twenty years from the
grant date because of failure to pay maintenance fees, because the technology becomes obsolete or
because of financial distress to the assignee. Patent terms can also be extended because of
regulatory delay; this is common for pharmaceutical patents.
39. Lanjouw & Schankerman, Small Firms, supra note 11, at 56.
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patent did not change much during the 1990s.40 We show a small
increase (11% over the interval from 1987 to 1999). In effect, the
increase in firm patenting rates largely offset the increase in the rate of
litigation per firm.
The measures for litigation hazards where the firm is the alleged
infringer are shown in columns three and four. The rate of litigation per
R&D dollar is calculated as the sample mean rate of litigation per firm
divided by the sample mean deflated R&D expenditure.41 In general, the
hazard of a public firm being an alleged infringer has been slightly less
than the hazard of the firm being a patentee litigant. But the hazard of
being an alleged infringer increased sharply, more than doubling from
1987 to 1999. Moreover, measured relative to R&D spending, the rate
still increased sharply—the hazard of being sued for each dollar of R&D
increased by 70% from 1987 to 1999.
The next three rows show these measures for firms of different sizes
and for newly public firms. Lanjouw and Schankerman report that small
firms have a much higher rate of litigation per patent,42 and we find the
same. A firm with fewer than 500 employees faces an enforcement
hazard per patent that is about four times larger than the hazard faced by
a larger firm. In addition, we find that the hazard of being sued relative
to R&D spending is nearly six times larger for a small firm. Newly public
firms show a similar pattern of increased relative hazards.
These large differences emphasize that multiple factors influence these
hazards. A simple model where, say, the hazard of being a plaintiff is
proportional to a firm’s patent portfolio size is likely to fit the data poorly.
Instead, we need to use a multiple regression approach to understand the
factors giving rise to trends in the hazards.
Finally, the bottom of Table 2 shows these statistics reported for
different industry groups. Different industries seem to exhibit very
different patterns. The instruments industry has high hazards relative
both to its patents and its R&D, while the business services industry has
low litigation rates by both measures.
Chemicals including
pharmaceuticals have a high rate of litigation per patent, but a low rate
per R&D. Electronics has the reverse: a low rate per patent and a high

40. Id. at 50.
41. If the rate of litigation per billion dollars of R&D is instead calculated as the mean individual
ratio of the number of suits to R&D expenditures and this figure is trimmed of the upper 1% tail,
the mean rate is 3.7 for the entire period, 1.3 for 1987 and 3.8 for 1999. This represents a 193%
increase from 1987 to 1999. The weighted mean (weighted by R&D) increased 73% from 1987 to
1999 (from 1.1 to 1.9).
42. Id. at 63–70.
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rate per R&D dollar.43
Again, mono-causal explanations are unlikely to explain these diverse
patterns. For example, the semiconductor industry is sometimes
described as having a low rate of litigation per patent because the
complex technology gives rise to patent trading based on “mutually
assured destruction.”44 But this explanation by itself seems unable to
account for the above average rate of litigation relative to R&D spending
in semiconductors.
B. What Difference do Industry and Technological Closeness Make?
We next look at characteristics of the pairs of firms involved in
lawsuits. Do firms tend to sue firms within their own industry or those
in other industries? Do they tend to sue firms that patent similar
technologies or those that patent more remote technologies? Table 3
provides some simple analysis for suits where both plaintiffs and
defendants are public firms.
Surprisingly, only 29% of these suits occurred between firms whose
primary line of business is in the same four-digit SIC industry. But 28%
involved firms that did not have a business segment in common even at
the three-digit SIC level. Compustat reports major business segments by
industry of firms since 1985. The second column of the Table includes
pairs of firms who share businesses in the same three-digit classification
but whose primary businesses are in different industries. This is a very
broad classification and likely includes many pairs that are not direct
competitors (e.g., computer manufacturers and stapler manufacturers are
in the same three-digit SIC classification). Nevertheless, a substantial
number of suits appear to involve firms that are not market competitors.45
Perhaps many of these suits are between firms that use similar
technologies. We use the technology closeness measure described above
to consider this possibility. Firms within the same industry tend to have
high closeness measures, but the closeness measure also varies
independently of industry, e.g., Apple Computers and Intel do not
compete directly in their major markets, but they have a closeness of 0.53.
The first row in Table 3 shows the percentage of pairs with closeness of
less than 0.5 and the second row those pairs with closeness greater than
or equal to 0.5. Still, 24% of the pairs neither share an industry segment
43. See Ziedonis, supra note 10, at 184 (reporting similar numbers for the semiconductor
industry).
44. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, supra note 11, at 468.
45. Some of these suits are probably against distributors of infringing products. The Table
excludes firms in the retail and wholesale industries for this reason. However, manual inspection
of some of the reported suits revealed that many are not against distributors.
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nor are technologically close.
Thus, although many suits, probably the majority, occur between firms
that are close either in the market place or in their patent portfolios, a
substantial percentage also occur between firms that are distant. This
suggests that it might be prohibitively expensive for firms to clear their
innovations for possible infringement accurately. There may simply be
too many patent holders that pose a litigation threat but who have
dissimilar technologies and products. If so, then inadvertent infringement
will not occur infrequently.
C. Regression Analysis of Pairs
To analyze what drives litigation, we begin by estimating logit
regressions of the probability that a firm with given characteristics will
sue a firm with other characteristics in a given year. For tractability, we
estimate this probability out of a sample of all pairs of firms who share
the same primary industry. We also exclude firms that are not matched
to the patent database and firms in the retail and wholesale industries
(there litigation is likely to be quite different and there were no intraindustry suits in these industries). Excluding observations missing key
data, there were 1,240,580 such pair-year observations from 1984–99.
Table 4, column one shows the simplest estimates. Firm employment
size is clearly significant for both parties with a coefficient of .54 for the
patentee litigant and .39 for the alleged infringer. Both coefficients are
significantly greater than zero, suggesting that scale matters both for
plaintiffs and defendants because it is associated with larger stakes in
litigation.46 But both coefficients are also significantly less than one.
This may be because larger companies may also be more diversified, so
that the stakes for the particular business unit at risk do not grow as fast
as the overall firm size. If we imagine that employment simultaneously
grows for both the firms, then we see that the probability of litigation
grows by almost the same proportion (because .54 + .39 = .93). Thus, we
see evidence that a general increase in stakes is associated with an
increasing in filing (Hypothesis 2).
All the other continuous variables are scaled by firm employment. The
coefficient on the log of the patentee litigant’s patent portfolio per
employee is also positive and highly significant, consistent with
Hypothesis 3. More patents mean that the patentee has better chances of
winning in court against the prospective infringer. This coefficient is also
significantly less than one.
46. To some extent, employment size may also pick up some measure of the number of
enforcement opportunities and the degree of exposure to other firms’ patents.
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The coefficient on the log of the alleged infringer’s patents per
employee is negative, but not significantly different from zero, providing
weak support for Hypothesis 4 (defensive patenting).
Regarding the two parties’ R&D spending per employee, the
coefficient for the patentee litigant is not significantly different from zero.
This result holds for all of the variations shown in Table 4. On the other
hand, the coefficient for the alleged infringer’s R&D is positive in all
variations and highly significant in all but the last column. This result is
consistent with Hypothesis 6 (exposure effect) and inconsistent with
Hypothesis 5 (inventing around), however, this regression does not
completely control for the stakes of each firm. It is possible that the
coefficient on firm 2’s R&D might be positive because this investment
increases the stakes (profits) that firm 2 makes. Employment size
captures the magnitude of firm stakes to the first order, however, there
might be some additional variation picked up by this coefficient. Given
that firm 1’s R&D does not seem to have such a positive effect on firm
1’s stakes, this explanation seems unlikely. To explore this issue more
carefully, we will add further controls on firm stakes below.
Column 2 adds our measure of technological proximity. The
coefficient is economically large and statistically highly significant,
supporting Hypothesis 1. This is a strong effect, especially since the
sample only includes pairs that are already in the same primary SIC
industry. The addition of this variable reduces the scale coefficients a bit,
perhaps suggesting that firms of larger size within an industry may also
inevitably have more overlapping technology.
Also, the coefficient on the alleged infringer’s patent portfolio size
becomes more negative and statistically significant. This suggests a
possible interaction between “defensive” patenting and technological
proximity. This idea is explored further in column 3 where both patent
portfolio size variables are interacted with a categorical variable
indicating whether the firms have a technological closeness greater than
or less than 0.5 (about 8% of the samples have technological closeness
greater than 0.5). Both of the close coefficients have larger magnitudes
in absolute value than their distant counterparts. This suggests that
defensive patenting mainly affects litigation among firms that are close
to rivals in technology space.
The fourth column repeats the regression of the first column, but adds
a term capturing the interaction of the two parties’ log patent portfolio
sizes. The coefficient of this term is not statistically significant. We also
tested a variety of other interactions to see if there were possible size
interaction effects or asymmetric patent portfolio effects (e.g., large
portfolio suing small portfolio). None of these were significantly
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different from zero.
The fifth column repeats the regression of the first column, adding
variables for log market value per employee and log capital per employee.
The market value variable may capture aspects of the firms’ stakes at risk
in litigation that are not captured by other variables. The positive
coefficients suggest this may be so. The measure of capital intensity may
indicate the extent to which the firm is at risk of holdup. Alleged
infringers with large capital costs may be particularly vulnerable to patent
injunctions, so they may settle more readily, avoiding litigation. The
coefficient on the alleged infringer’s capital intensity is negative and
significant at the 5% level, providing some support for this hypothesis.
The coefficient on the patentee litigant’s capital intensity is also negative
(but only significant at the 10% level), perhaps suggesting that capital
intensive patent holders also settle more frequently to avoid holdup
associated with counter-suits.
With the additional control for firm stakes, the coefficient for firm 2’s
R&D is still positive, however, it is no longer statistically significant.
This provides weak support for Hypothesis 6 (exposure effect). We will
revisit this estimate in the next Section, where we measure the equivalent
coefficient with greater precision.
D. Regression Analysis of Aggregate Hazards
As described above, the firm hazard of being a patentee litigant equals
the sum of the probabilities of litigation for all possible firms the patentee
might sue, assuming these probabilities are independent. The hazard of
being an alleged infringer is likewise a sum over possible plaintiffs. This
means that the coefficients of firm hazards may have a simple
relationship to the coefficients estimated in Table 4. In particular, if the
coefficients on interaction terms involving a variable are zero, then the
coefficients on that variable should match. On the other hand, we
estimate the hazards over a different sample than the sample used in Table
4—the new sample includes suits where the opposing party may be in a
different industry and may not be a public firm.
Table 5 reports estimates of firm hazard Poisson regressions for all
public firms from 1984 to 1999. The dependent variable in the upper
panel is the number of times that the firm is a patentee litigant in a year;
in the lower panel, the dependent variable is the number of times that the
firm is an alleged infringer in a year. As before, the continuous variables
are scaled by firm employment.
Despite the difference in samples, the coefficients in column 1 are
close to those in column 1 of Table 4: the coefficient on the patentee
litigant’s log portfolio size per employee is .39 in both tables, the
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coefficient on log employment is .47 compared to .54 in Table 4; the
coefficient on the alleged infringer’s log deflated R&D per employee is
.26 compared to .25 in Table 4, and that on log employment is .48
compared to .39. The only substantial difference is in the coefficients on
the alleged infringer’s log patent portfolio per employee which is now
.10, but was -.08 in Table 4. Since we suggest above that this coefficient
may be influenced by technological closeness, and since the current
sample includes many more firms that are more distant (since they are no
longer constrained to be in the same industry), this may reflect less
defensive patenting among firms that are not technologically close.
We tested this and all the other regressions in this Table for overdispersion, which we found to be significant. For this reason, we use
standard errors that are robust to heteroscedasticity. 47 Also, we ran
negative binomial regressions (not shown). The coefficients on these
were quite similar to those from the Poisson regressions.
Column 2 adds the patentee litigant’s log R&D to employment (and a
dummy variable for zero reported R&D) and log capital per employee in
both regressions. Column 3 further adds log market value per employee,
the log of other firms’ closeness-weighted patent portfolios and the log
of other firms’ closeness-weighted R&D. As discussed above, the
coefficients on capital intensity may reflect evidence of strategic
patenting and they are both negative and significant. The distanceweighted measures do not appear to have significant effects, perhaps
because other variables already capture the effect of close competitors.
Note that now the coefficient on the alleged infringer’s R&D remains
positive and highly significant, even when controlling for firm market
value and employment. Given these controls, the positive coefficient
cannot be explained by any effect R&D might have on firm stakes.
Instead, this finding rejects Hypothesis 5 (inventing around) and is
consistent with Hypothesis 6 (exposure effect).
Table 5 also shows the coefficients on industry dummies (“Other nonmanufacturing” is the excluded category). 48 The pattern is quite similar
to the pattern observed in Table 2. Firms in chemical, pharmaceutical
and instruments industries are more likely to sue; firms in nonmanufacturing industries are much less likely to sue. Firms in electronics
and instruments and retail/wholesale industries are more likely to be sued.
47. The negative binomial estimates are inconsistent if the true distribution is not actually
negative binomial. The Poisson estimates, on the other hand, will still be consistent even with overdispersion, so we prefer to present Poisson estimates using heteroscedasticity-robust standard
errors.
48. Table 4 regressions also included industry dummies but these were not displayed because
their standard errors are substantially larger than those in Table 5.
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Firms in business services including software and other nonmanufacturing are less likely to be sued.
Table 5 does not display the year dummies, but the year dummies for
both regressions in column 3 are displayed in Figure 2. Also, Table 5
displays the average annual increase in the year dummies for each
regression from 1987 to 1999. The year dummies can be interpreted as
relative (log) residuals, that is, as the portion of the hazard rate not
explained by the observed right hand variables. Trends in the residuals
indicate the portion of the growth in firm litigation hazards that is not
explained by these variables. In particular, column 3 includes variables
that correspond to many of the obvious explanations for the increase in
litigation: patent portfolio variables capture the increase in patenting
rates, R&D and capital variables capture the increase in both types of
investment, market value variables capture otherwise unobserved
changes in “innovative fertility” and other sources of firm value,
employment variables capture changes in firm scale and the closenessweighted measure captures changes in technological density.
The residual growth rates and the pattern shown in Figure 2 clearly
show that most of the increase in both litigation hazards is not explained
by these factors. The residual accounts for most (68%) of the 5.5%
annual growth rate in the hazard of being a patentee litigant and most
(75%) of the 8.4% annual growth rate in the hazard of being an alleged
infringer.
In column 3, the log of market value per employee captures otherwise
unobserved differences in the value of firms’ technologies. Another way
to capture these is by using forward patent citations, although this does
reduce the sample size. Column 4 shows a regression with the adjusted
(for patent class) mean number of forward citations for each firm’s patent
portfolio.49 Having a more highly cited patent portfolio does make a firm
more likely to sue; it also makes a firm more likely to be sued. The latter
finding may suggest that some portion of causation runs from litigation
to patent characteristics rather than the other way.
Table 6 repeats the regressions from column 2 of Table 5 for different
sub-samples (we also added a dummy variable for newly public firms).
The first pair of columns conducts the regressions separately for firms in
SIC 28 (chemical and pharmaceutical industries) and for a group of
industries where strategic patenting behavior has been observed (SIC 35,
36, 38 and 73, machinery including computers, electronics, instruments
and business services including software). One difference that stands out
49. We also ran regressions using backward citations and claims. The coefficient on backward
citations was statistically significant, but small. That on claims was insignificant on both counts.
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is that patent portfolio size tends to be a relatively stronger determinant
of litigation in the latter group while R&D tends to be a stronger influence
in chemicals and pharmaceuticals. This is, perhaps, not surprising given
the relative importance the “thicket” industries place on patent portfolios.
The larger coefficient on the patentee’s R&D in pharmaceuticals may
suggest that R&D increases firm stakes; alternatively, it may simply be
an artifact of the unusual role that generic manufacturers play in this
industry’s litigation—R&D intensive drug manufacturers are more likely
to sue than are low-R&D generic manufacturers.
The second comparison is between large and small firms. Generally,
both patents and R&D tend to be more strongly associated with litigation
among large firms than among small.
Finally, the last pair of columns compares the regression at the
beginning and end of the sample period. Although the time dummies
have increased dramatically during this period, the slope coefficients
have not, in general, changed significantly.
Table 7 shows estimates of the growth rate of the residuals for different
sub-samples. Here the regression is conducted from 1987–99 and
includes a linear time trend instead of individual year dummies. The
Table reports the coefficient of the time trend (with standard error)
expressed as an annual percentage rate. Only one growth rate shows a
statistically significant difference from the mean: the growth rate in the
residual hazard for instrument firms as patentee litigants.
IV. INTERPRETATION
A. Drivers of Litigation: “Cheating” or “Exposure”?
Summarizing the above results, the main factors influencing litigation
hazards are the scale of the firms, the number of patents held by
prospective plaintiffs, the R&D performed by prospective defendants, the
capital intensity of the parties and, for the probability of litigation
between a given pair of firms, the technological distance between them.
Measured technological distance does not seem to matter much for the
aggregate litigation hazards.
This evidence supports several of our hypotheses. Technological
proximity matters for pairs of firms (H1). Firm scale should be an
important variable because it relates to the magnitude of what the firms
have at stake in litigation (H2). The importance of the prospective
plaintiff’s patent portfolio size underlines the importance of refinement
(H3)—firms can improve their prospects in patent disputes by building a
larger patent portfolio, among other things.
Our findings also cast considerable doubt on the idea that most patent
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litigation is caused by outright piracy or other forms of “cheating” such
as inventing around. Most alleged infringers are not low-tech copyists
who imitate to avoid R&D; instead, most invest heavily in R&D.
Moreover, the probability of patent litigation increases with the level of
the prospective defendant’s R&D spending even after controlling for firm
size and market value. This suggests that this R&D is not being directed
to “inventing around,” rather, greater investment in technology seems to
increase the firm’s exposure to infringement. And the difficulty of
avoiding inadvertent infringement is highlighted by the significant
portion of lawsuits that occur between firms that are in completely
different industries and are also technologically distant.
Several other findings also cast doubt on the “cheating” story. In a
model of monitoring like that developed by Crampes and Langinier,50
one would expect large firms to monitor more intensively, leading to less
infringement and less litigation. But the probability of litigation increases
with the size of the prospective plaintiff. Also, one would expect
litigation to be far less in those industries where reverse engineering costs
little. But the computer and instruments industries have high rates of
litigation per patent despite having well-developed practices of reverse
engineering. Indeed, this suggests a reason why relatively little litigation
seems to be generated by cheating: cheating can occur only if firms find
it costly or difficult to monitor for infringement. However, if monitoring
(reverse engineering) is costly or difficult, then trade secrecy is probably
relatively effective and firms may therefore be less likely to patent in the
first place.
We conclude that although cheating certainly occurs in some instances,
most litigation appears to be driven by “exposure,” and, consequently,
firms’ rapidly growing hazard of being sued for infringement likely
reduces their R&D incentives.
B. The Effect of Patent Portfolio Size
The data in Table 2 imply that litigation imposes a much larger burden
on small firms. Lanjouw and Schankerman find evidence of large
differences in litigation rates per patent across size groups. 51 Our
evidence affirms theirs and, in addition, we find evidence that small firms
have much higher rates of litigation as alleged infringers per R&D dollar.
Lanjouw and Schankerman suggest that this “portfolio size effect”
may be due to two forms of strategic interaction: (1) patent trading where
50. Crampes & Langinier, supra note 7, at 260–62 (modeling monitoring decisions using one
static game scenario and two alternative sequential games).
51. Lanjouw & Schankerman, Small Firms, supra note 11, at 63.
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firms with large patent portfolios more easily cross-license and settle
rather than litigate, and (2) repeated interaction between large firms, also
inducing more frequent settlement.52 These explanations attribute the
size effect to the interaction between the firms—there is less litigation
when the alleged infringer is able to retaliate with a countersuit using its
own patents either in the disputed market or, given repeated interactions,
in other markets and at other times.
We do find significant evidence of some such interaction between
firms: a firm with greater capital intensity is less likely to sue, perhaps
because of the greater risk of retaliation; a firm with greater capital
intensity is less likely to be sued, perhaps because such firms settle more
readily. However, a standard deviation change in capital intensity only
changes the probability of litigation by about 20%, so this cannot explain
the large observed differences in litigation per patent.
We also find some evidence of patent trading and defensive patenting.
However, defensive patenting only seems to play a limited role reducing
litigation between firms that are technologically close. The size of the
defendant’s portfolio does not reduce litigation hazard in the aggregate.
Instead, our regressions suggest that there may be a more basic
explanation for the portfolio size effect that does not depend on strategic
interaction between firms, namely, that there may be diminishing returns
to patent portfolio size. In all of our regressions, the coefficient on the
plaintiff’s patent portfolio size per employee is well below one. Of
course this ignores the effect of the plaintiff firm’s size. Our regressions
cannot fully distinguish between the effect of the plaintiff’s scale, which
may affect litigation because it changes the plaintiff’s stake, and the direct
effect of patent portfolio size. But even assuming that the coefficient on
log employment is entirely due to the greater number of patents held by
larger firms, the sum of the two coefficients in Table 5 is still significantly
less than one. For example, in column 5, the combined effect of
employment and patents per employee has an elasticity of 0.86.
At first glance, the idea of diminishing returns to patent portfolio size
may seem counter-intuitive. After all, if two firms merge, pooling their
patent portfolios, why should this affect the rate of litigation per patent?
But such a merger would affect the probability of winning a suit against
a third firm—the probability of winning a suit will typically not double.53
52. Id. at 46–47.
53. See Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 36
(2005) (showing that while individual patents may not proportionally increase litigation rates,
patent portfolios can “serve as important defense mechanisms in a highly litigious environment”);
James Bessen, Patent Thickets: Strategic Patenting of Complex Technologies 3 (Oct. 3, 2002)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.researchoninnovation.org/thicket.pdf (expl-

BESSEN AND MEURER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

The Patent Litigation Explosion

12/11/2013 5:36 PM

427

For example, this will be the case if each patent has an independent
probability of being found valid and infringed. And this means that the
probability of litigation need not double either. Patent portfolio size
exhibits diminishing returns to the probability of winning a suit. This
means, in turn, that the probability of litigation increases less than
proportionately with the plaintiff’s patent portfolio size.
C. The Growth in Hazard Rates
Measured firm characteristics seem to explain only a fraction of the
growth in firm litigation hazards. The majority of the increase cannot be
explained by the growth in R&D spending, the value of firm technology,
the growth in technological crowdedness or the growth in patenting
(either because of “innovative fertility” or because of greater patent
propensity).
What else might explain this rapid growth? We can think of two broad
classes of factors: technology and legal changes. Technology might
cause increased litigation if technological changes tended to erode
industry norms of cooperation or mutual forbearance. For example, as
technologies mature, industries often experience shake-outs. This might
give rise to sales of patents to “trolls” by distressed firms or to anticompetitive actions by established firms, both possibly increasing
litigation. However, this explanation seems unlikely, given that the
growth of the residual in Table 7 does not vary sharply across industries.
It does not seem likely that all industries experienced shakeouts in the
1990s.
Technology might have also increased the cost of monitoring for
infringement, leading to more “cheating” and more detected disputes.
But this explanation does not seem promising because the increase in
litigation seems to occur across all technologies, and thus we need to
identify some far-reaching event that has increased the cost monitoring
for patent infringement in all sorts of technology. The Internet and other
improvements in communications probably have reduced the cost of
monitoring.
Another technological factor might be the greater use of generalpurpose technologies. Suppose that firms in a wide variety of industries
began using general purpose technologies more intensively and also
patented these technologies. This might lead to greater litigation for two
reasons: first, firms might be more likely to innocently infringe because
they do not search applications outside of their own industry as
aining that “the more patents a firm has related to a given product, the greater the joint probability
of prevailing at trial”).
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intensively (and there may be many more patents to search); second,
inter-industry disputes might be less likely to settle because disputants
are not likely to interact repeatedly.
One candidate for such general-purpose technology patents is
software, which, of course, also went through a change in legal status.
Software patents are obtained across a wide variety of industries and are
used in a wide variety of applications. Using a definition of software
patent from Bessen and Hunt,54 we found that software patents accounted
for 3% of the main patents litigated in 1984 and 17% in 1999. Moreover,
note that some of the industries that use software do tend to have
somewhat higher residual growth rates in Table 7, especially as alleged
infringers. So software patents contributed to the growth in the litigation
residual. However, this does not seem to be the main factor, especially
since, again, Table 7 indicates that all industries exhibited substantial
growth in the residual.
This leaves various legal changes as the likely candidates for the
dominant factors affecting the growth in the litigation residual. Landes
and Posner suggest that the creation of a unified appeals court for patent
cases increased the uncertainty of legal outcomes instead of improving
the predictability of patent law, leading to increased litigation. 55 Our
results are consistent with this view, especially greater “noise” regarding
the interpretation of standards of patentability and vaguer boundaries of
patent claims.
Another factor may have been a pro-patentee shift in the law. Such a
shift might lead to more litigation (although in some circumstances it
might just lead to less infringement). Litigation may have become more
attractive if the risk of patent invalidation (e.g., for obviousness) were
decreased. Lunney presents evidence of just such a switch—reviewing
appellate decisions, he finds a sharp decrease in the portion of patents
found invalid, although he also finds an increase in the portion of patents
found not to be infringed.56
These legal changes would tend to affect firms in all industries,
consistent with our estimates. And the fact that the rapid growth in
litigation began after 1987—just five years after the creation of the Court
54. Bessen & Hunt, supra note 24, at 8 (defining a “software patent” as one that “involves a
logic algorithm for processing data that is implemented via stored instructions; that is, the logic is
not ‘hard-wired’”).
55. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 12, at 334–53.
56. Glynn Lunney, Jr., Patent Law, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court: A Quiet
Revolution, 11 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1 (2004); see also Matthew D. Henry & John L. Turner, The
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s Impact on Patent Litigation, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 85, 90
(2005) (analyzing how the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s stronger presumption of
validity impacts litigation outcomes at the district court level).
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of Appeals for the Federal Circuit—adds weight to this interpretation.
Thus, barring some explanation we have not considered, legal changes
seem to be the dominant factor accounting for the rapid rise in litigation.
CONCLUSION
Most of the rapid increase in patent litigation hazards over the 1990s
cannot be explained by firm patenting rates, R&D spending, firm value
or industry composition. Looking at a variety of explanations, we
conclude that legal changes may be the dominant factor driving this
increase. This implies that the increase in patent litigation represents a
growing disincentive to R&D that is not likely offset by growth in the
number or value of innovations.
Furthermore, we find evidence that this disincentive is borne by firms
not only in their roles as patent holders, but also as innovators having to
defend against patent lawsuits. We find that the more R&D a firm
performs, the more likely it is to be sued. In most industries, this pattern
of litigation is inconsistent with the view that most defendants in patent
lawsuits are simple pirates or imitators. Instead, patent defendants are, to
a large degree, innovators themselves, spending as much on R&D as the
plaintiffs. Moreover, about a quarter of patent lawsuits occur between
firms that are in different industries and are also “technologically
distant,” suggesting that ex ante licensing and avoidance of patent
disputes are difficult. Thus an important part of the burden of patent
disputes falls on defending firms. This distinction is important because
although the rate of litigation per patent among public firms as plaintiffs
did not increase much from 1987 to 1999, the rate of litigation per R&D
dollar among public firms as defendants increased 70%.
Also, as Lanjouw and Schankerman find,57 the risk of litigation falls
disproportionately on small firms. However, this does not appear to be
mainly the result of better dispute resolution among large firms through
patent trading and “defensive” patenting. We find that the defendant’s
portfolio size has, at best, only a limited effect on the probability of
litigation, mainly among firms that are technologically close. Any
optimism that “defensive” patenting might serve to reduce the growth of
litigation is probably misplaced.
Finally, our results shed some light on the changes in litigation
hazards, but our results are limited in that they say nothing about the
actual costs associated with filing lawsuits and subsequent litigation and
the effects of these costs on R&D. Nevertheless, there is cause for
concern. Event studies find that the joint market value of plaintiffs and
57. Lanjouw & Schankerman, Small Firms, supra note 11, at 63.
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defendants falls by 2–3% on the filing of a patent lawsuit,58 suggesting
that the economic burden on litigants may be substantial. So the recent
doubling of litigation hazards may well impose substantial costs.

58. See, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat, James A. Brickley & Jeffrey L. Coles, The Costs of Inefficient
Bargaining and Financial Distress: Evidence from Corporate Lawsuits, 35 J. FIN. ECON. 221, 230–
31 (1994) (reporting wealth effects of corporate lawsuits); Lerner, supra note 3, at 471 (finding that
the combined market value of firms fell by an average of 3.1% in the two days after the Wall Street
Journal reported the lawsuit filing).
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TABLES AND FIGURES
Table 1. Sample Characteristics
Means
Litigants by type
All
Patentees
Alleged
Litigants
Infringers
244.8
261.9
307.1

All
Firms
37.6

All
Patenters
69.8

5.2

10.0

23.7

24.4

28.5

846.7

1933.9

5147.6

5382.7

6195.5

44.1

92.7

375.8

424.6

442.7

Portfolio adjusted
claims/patent

3.0

2.8

2.9

2.5

Portfolio adjusted cites
made/patent

2.0

2.2

2.4

2.1

Portfolio adjusted cites
rec'd/patent

3.1

3.5

3.8

3.2

R&D
Employment
Sales
Portfolio size

New firm

38%

22%

19%

16%

19%

No R&D

70%

31%

21%

16%

22%

No Patents

77%

13%

8%

16%

Medians
R&D

2.9

6.4

25.8

33.7

29.6

Employment

0.5

1.2

4.4

5.1

5.5

64.9

171.1

654.4

832.9

793.6

Sales

Portfolio size
0
6
31
51
30
Note: Litigants exclude firms in retail and wholesaling industries and in SIC
6794, patent holding & franchising companies. 118,495 observations from
1984–99. Employment is in thousands. R&D and sales are deflated by the
GDP deflator. New firms are observations where the firm has been listed in
Compustat for five or fewer years. Portfolio size is the number of patents
granted over the previous eight years.

BESSEN AND MEURER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

432

12/11/2013 5:36 PM

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 45

Table 2. Litigation Hazards for Firms with Patent Portfolios and
Positive R&D
As Patentee
As Alleged
Litigant
Infringer
Expected
Suits
Expected
Suits
Suits per
per
Suits per
per
year
1000
year
$billion
patents
R&D
All Firms
1987
1999
Small firms
(employment<500)
Large firms
(employment>=500)
New firms

0.223
0.198
0.271
0.079

11.8
10.5
11.7
42.5

0.185
0.116
0.256
0.064

2.5
1.7
2.9
12.3

0.304

10.7

0.254

2.2

0.114

30.3

0.095

5.9

BY INDUSTRY
Chemicals/pharmaceuticals
0.334
14.4
0.229
2.1
Machinery/computers
0.217
13.0
0.170
2.3
Electronics
0.202
8.8
0.194
3.6
SIC 3674
0.216
7.8
0.225
3.2
Instruments
0.216
17.6
0.191
6.4
Other manufacturing
0.230
10.3
0.188
1.8
Business svcs/software
0.108
8.4
0.103
1.3
Retail/wholesale
0.021
5.9
0.111
10.9
Other non-manufacturing
0.141
8.0
0.152
2.1
Note: 20,522 observations from 1984–99 for firms with positive patent
portfolio size and positive R&D. R&D figures are deflated by the GDP
deflator. Raw hazard rates have been adjusted for underreporting (divided
by .64).
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Table 3. Lawsuits by Technological Closeness and Industry Overlap
No
Weakly
Same
Total
industry
overlapping
primary
Technological
overlap
industries
industry
Closeness
Distant
24%
28%
11%
63%
Close
4%
15%
18%
37%
Total
28%
43%
29%
100%
Note: For 680 lawsuits where parties on both sides are public firms. Firms
in the retail and wholesale industries have been excluded. “Same primary
industry” means both parties’ primary business is in the same four-digit SIC
industry. “Weakly overlapping industries” means the parties had a business
segment in the same three-digit SIC industry. “Distant” and “close” refer to
a closeness measure >=.5 and <.5 respectively.
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Table 4. Logit Regression of Probability of Suit
1

2

3

4

5

Patentee litigant
Log patents/employee

0.40 (0.07)

0.38 (0.07)

Ln patent/emp * distant

0.35 (0.08)

Ln patent/emp * close

0.43 (0.08)

Zero patents dummy

0.45 (0.09)

0.41 (0.07)

-1.62 (0.62)

-1.31 (0.62)

-1.30 (0.63)

-1.57 (0.62)

-1.92 (0.75)

Log employment

0.54 (0.03)

0.46 (0.04)

0.47 (0.04)

0.53 (0.03)

0.56 (0.04)

Log R&D/employee

0.00 (0.09)

-0.07 (0.09)

-0.07 (0.09)

No R&D dummy

0.25 (0.41)

0.28 (0.42)

0.27 (0.42)

-0.12 (0.09)

Log Mkt.
Value/employee
Log capital/employee

0.26 (0.09)
-0.23 (0.13)

Alleged Infringer
Log patents/employee

-0.08 (0.06)

-0.16 (0.06)

Ln patent/emp * distant

0.00 (0.11)

-0.04 (0.06)

-0.08 (0.07)

Ln patent/emp * close

-0.23 (0.07)

Zero patents dummy

-0.92 (0.29)

-0.71 (0.30)

-0.65 (0.30)

-0.93 (0.29)

-1.07 (0.33)

Log R&D/employee

0.25 (0.08)

0.18 (0.08)

0.18 (0.08)

0.25 (0.08)

0.13 (0.10)

No R&D dummy

0.12 (0.38)

0.15 (0.39)

0.19 (0.39)

0.17 (0.38)

0.32 (0.39)

Log employment

0.39 (0.04)

0.28 (0.04)

0.28 (0.04)

0.39 (0.04)

0.13 (0.09)

Log Mkt.
Value/employee
Log capital/employee

0.30 (0.09)
-0.26 (0.13)

Interaction terms
plaintiff ln pat/emp*defendant ln pat/emp
Technological closeness
Number of obs
Log likelihood =

-0.03 (0.03)
2.35 (0.24)

2.47 (0.38)

1,240,580

1,240,580

1,240,580

1,240,580

994,148

-1568.9

-1522.8

-1521.3

-1568.6

-1400.4

Note: Logit regressions with industry and year dummies not shown.
Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. Patents are the portfolio size, that
is, the number of patents granted the previous eight years. Dummy variables
report zero patents and zero R&D. R&D and market value are deflated by
the GDP deflator, capital is property, plant and equipment deflated by the
NIPA capital goods deflator and employment is in thousands. Technological
closeness measure is described in text.
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Table 5. Poisson Regressions of the Number of Suits Per Year
1

2

3

4

Suits as patentee litigant
Log portfolio size

0.39 (0.02)

0.37 (0.02)

0.36 (0.02)

Portfolio=0 dummy

-1.46 (0.14)

-1.41 (0.15)

-1.20 (0.21)

Portfolio size missing

-0.98 (0.19)

-0.89 (0.19)

-0.91 (0.20)

0.10 (0.03)

-0.06 (0.03)

0.09 (0.03)

-0.30 (0.11)

-0.39 (0.11)

0.04 (0.12)

0.49 (0.01)

0.51 (0.02)

0.51 (0.02)

-0.23 (0.03)

-0.40 (0.04)

-0.33 (0.05)

Log R&D/emp.
R&D not reported
Log employment

0.47 (0.01)

Log capital/emp.
Log mkt. Value/emp.

0.40 (0.03)

0.39 (0.04)

Log other firms' patents

-0.02 (0.11)

Log other firms' R&D

0.06 (0.11)

Adj. Cites rec'd/patent

0.017 (0.003)

Chemicals/pharmaceuticals

1.18 (0.19)

0.86 (0.19)

0.82 (0.20)

0.73 (0.22)

Machinery/computers

0.88 (0.18)

0.46 (0.19)

0.57 (0.20)

0.31 (0.22)

Electronics

0.95 (0.18)

0.55 (0.19)

0.66 (0.20)

0.34 (0.22)

Instruments

1.20 (0.19)

0.74 (0.20)

0.82 (0.21)

0.59 (0.24)

Other manufacturing

0.63 (0.17)

0.42 (0.17)

0.47 (0.17)

0.28 (0.20)

Business svcs/software

0.52 (0.21)

-0.05 (0.23)

0.00 (0.23)

-0.12 (0.29)

-0.80 (0.26)

-1.05 (0.27)

-0.81 (0.28)

-0.64 (0.40)

Retail/wholesale
Residual growth (sample: 5.5%)
Log likelihood =

4.0%

4.7%

3.7%

6.1%

-9751.1

-9645.3

-9035.3

-7187.8
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Table 5, continued
Suits as alleged infringer
Log portfolio size

0.10 (0.02)

0.11 (0.02)

0.11 (0.02)

Portfolio=0 dummy

-0.75 (0.09)

-0.76 (0.09)

-0.60 (0.11)

Portfolio size missing

-1.23 (0.12)

-1.19 (0.12)

-1.13 (0.12)

0.26 (0.02)

0.28 (0.02)

0.15 (0.03)

0.25 (0.03)

R&D not reported

-0.23 (0.09)

-0.22 (0.09)

-0.29 (0.09)

0.11 (0.11)

Log employment

0.48 (0.01)

0.50 (0.01)

0.53 (0.01)

0.53 (0.01)

-0.12 (0.02)

-0.30 (0.03)

-0.23 (0.04)

Log R&D/emp.

Log capital/emp.
Log mkt. Value/emp.

0.17 (0.02)

0.35 (0.03)

Log other firms' patents

0.12 (0.09)

Log other firms' R&D

-0.10 (0.10)

Adj. Cites rec'd/patent

0.014 (0.003)

Chemicals/pharmaceuticals

0.65 (0.13)

0.53 (0.13)

0.49 (0.13)

0.18 (0.14)

Machinery/computers

0.55 (0.12)

0.36 (0.13)

0.48 (0.13)

-0.02 (0.14)

Electronics

0.79 (0.12)

0.61 (0.12)

0.70 (0.13)

0.18 (0.14)

Instruments

1.04 (0.13)

0.84 (0.13)

0.89 (0.14)

0.40 (0.14)

Other manufacturing

0.43 (0.10)

0.30 (0.10)

0.34 (0.11)

-0.09 (0.12)

Business svcs/software

0.01 (0.15)

-0.26 (0.16)

-0.26 (0.16)

-0.49 (0.22)

Retail/wholesale

0.85 (0.11)

0.61 (0.12)

0.75 (0.12)

0.70 (0.22)

Residual growth (sample: 8.4%)
Number of obs
Log likelihood =

6.7%

7.2%

6.3%

8.5%

93,333

87,856

76,843

15,811

-10253.4

-10153.9

-9318.8

-6014.5

Note: Regressions are Poisson regressions with year dummies and
independent variables lagged one year. Standard errors are heteroscedastic
robust. R&D and market value are deflated by the GDP deflator, capital is
property, plant and equipment deflated by the NIPA capital goods deflator
and employment is in thousands. Cites received is adjusted for mean for
patent class. Residual growth is annual growth rate of time dummies.
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Table 6. Separate Litigation Poisson Regressions Dependent Variable:
Number of Lawsuits as Patentee Litigants or Alleged Infringers
Industry Group
Lagged
independent
variables

Chemicals & Thicket
pharmaIndustries
ceuticals

Firm Employment Size
<500

500

Year
84 – 91

92 – 99

Patentee Litigants
Log portfolio size

0.23 (0.06) 0.38 (0.03)

Portfolio=0
dummy

0.14 (0.35) -1.39 (0.21) -1.13 (0.26) -2.00 (0.23) -1.24 (0.23) -1.53 (0.19)

Portfolio size
missing
Log R&D/emp.

0.28 (0.06)

0.41 (0.03)

0.41 (0.04)

0.35 (0.03)

-0.91 (0.48) -0.96 (0.32) -1.03 (0.26) -0.69 (0.28) -1.14 (0.32) -0.73 (0.24)
0.41 (0.07) -0.04 (0.04) -0.12 (0.05)

0.22 (0.04)

0.11 (0.05)

0.09 (0.04)

R&D not reported

-0.33 (0.56) -0.29 (0.18) -0.80 (0.27) -0.08 (0.12) -0.27 (0.17) -0.39 (0.15)

Log capital/emp.

-0.43 (0.09) -0.02 (0.05) -0.20 (0.09) -0.28 (0.04) -0.25 (0.06) -0.20 (0.04)

Log employment

0.74 (0.04) 0.45 (0.02)

0.49 (0.07)

0.47 (0.02)

0.48 (0.02)

0.50 (0.02)

Newly public firm -0.45 (0.23) 0.28 (0.13)

0.28 (0.14)

0.28 (0.15) -0.01 (0.16)

0.27 (0.12)

No. Observations
Log likelihood

5345

26684

43464

44458

40518

47404

-1451

-4692

-2480

-7007

-3827

-5798

Alleged Infringers
Log portfolio size

0.04 (0.06) 0.18 (0.02)

0.02 (0.05)

0.14 (0.02)

0.12 (0.03)

0.11 (0.02)

Portfolio=0
dummy

-0.43 (0.35) -0.59 (0.13) -0.56 (0.21) -1.06 (0.11) -0.96 (0.14) -0.66 (0.11)

Portfolio size
missing

-0.41 (0.46) -1.32 (0.22) -1.42 (0.20) -1.08 (0.14) -1.27 (0.19) -1.16 (0.14)

Log R&D/emp.

0.36 (0.06) 0.20 (0.03)

0.20 (0.05)

0.31 (0.03)

0.27 (0.04)

0.28 (0.03)

R&D not reported

-1.68 (0.61) 0.04 (0.15) -0.30 (0.26) -0.07 (0.09) -0.21 (0.14) -0.17 (0.11)

Log capital/emp.

-0.25 (0.09) 0.07 (0.04) -0.06 (0.06) -0.15 (0.03) -0.15 (0.04) -0.10 (0.03)

Log employment

0.60 (0.03) 0.47 (0.02)

0.40 (0.06)

0.51 (0.02)

0.50 (0.02)

0.51 (0.01)

Newly public firm

0.02 (0.23) 0.03 (0.09)

0.31 (0.11)

0.10 (0.09)

0.16 (0.11)

0.14 (0.08)

No. Observations

5345

26684

43464

44458

40518

47404

-1209

-4497

-2415

-7684

-3804

-6352

Log likelihood

Note: Regressions are Poisson regressions with year dummies, industry
dummies and independent variables lagged one year. Standard errors are
heteroscedastic robust. R&D, cashflow and market value are deflated by the
GDP deflator, capital is property, plant and equipment deflated by the NIPA
capital goods deflator and employment is in thousands. The “new firm”
dummy is equal to one for the first five years a firm appears in Compustat.
Thicket industries are SIC 35, 36, 38 and 73.
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Table 7. Annual Growth Rate of Residual for Sub-samples
linear trend 1987-99
As patentee litigant

As alleged infringer

Chemicals/pharmaceuticals

2.9%

(2.4)%

7.4%

(1.9)%

Machinery/computers

5.7%

(1.9)%

8.3%

(1.7)%

Electronics

6.6%

(2.3)%

2.9%

(1.8)%

Instruments

9.3%

(1.9)%

7.2%

(1.9)%

Other manufacturing

6.2%

(1.5)%

7.7%

(1.3)%

Business services/software

2.3%

(4.7)%

9.2%

(4.0)%

Retail/wholesale

8.1%

(6.3)%

4.3%

(2.7)%

-1.1%

(4.2)%

6.8%

(2.6)%

New firms

7.8%

(2.2)%

5.4%

(1.7)%

Incumbent firms

3.9%

(1.0)%

6.3%

(0.7)%

Small firms

5.1%

(1.8)%

5.7%

(1.7)%

Large firms

4.4%

(1.0)%

6.4%

(0.7)%

ALL

4.3%

(0.9)%

6.1%

(0.7)%

Other non-manufacturing

Note: Regressions are Poisson regressions with linear year trend from 1987–
99. Independent variables are lagged one year. Standard errors, in
parentheses, are heteroscedasticity robust. New firms (incumbent firms)
have been listed in Compustat for five years or fewer (more). Small firms
(large firms) have fewer than 500 employees (more).

BESSEN AND MEURER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

12/11/2013 5:36 PM

The Patent Litigation Explosion

439

Figure 1. Patent Lawsuits Filed Annually (Derwent data from USPTO)
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Figure 2. Residual Time Trends for Litigation Hazards from Table 5,
Column 3.
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